Length Matters (I) - The Einstein--Swann Correspondence and the Constructive Approach to the Special Theory of Relativity by Hagar, Amit
Length Matters (I)
The Einstein–Swann Correspondence and the
Constructive Approach to the Special Theory of
Relativity
Amit Hagar∗
October 2, 2007
Abstract
In this paper and its sequel I discuss a rarely mentioned correspondence
between Einstein and W.F.G. Swann on the constructive approach to the
special theory of relativity, in which Einstein points out that the attempts
to construct a dynamical explanation of relativistic kinematical effects re-
quire postulating a minimal length scale in the level of the dynamics. I use
this correspondence to shed light on several issues under dispute in current
philosophy of spacetime that were highlighted recently in Harvey Brown’s
monograph Physical Relativity, namely, Einstein’s view on the distinction
between principle and constructive theories, and the philosophical conse-
quences of pursuing the constructive approach to the special theory of rela-
tivity.
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1 Introduction
Considerable attention has been drawn lately to the distinction, attributed to Ein-
stein, between principle and constructive theories, and to the methodological im-
portance it may have to the scientific practice. Viewed as part of the context of
discovery, however, this distinction is rarely acknowledged as having any philo-
sophical significance, with the exception of Howard (2004) who urges us to regard
it as one of Einstein’s most valuable contributions to 20th–Century philosophy of
science. In this paper and its sequel I would like to demonstrate this significance,
suggesting that while the principle–constructive distinction furnishes the physicist
with an important methodological tool, it also carries a philosophical weight, to
the extent that it serves as a demarcation mark in debates that may seem purely
epistemological or metaphysical.
Admittedly, while Einstein was not the first to introduce the distinction be-
tween principle and constructive theories to theoretical physics, he definitely pop-
ularized it when reflecting along his career on the conception of STR. Express-
ing the novelty of the theory, Einstein ultimately chose the principle view over
the constructive view, but his ambivalence with respect to this choice (and his
misgivings about what he regarded as its unfortunate implications on the founda-
tions of quantum mechanics) are well known (Schilpp 1949, Janssen 2000, Brown
2005ab). What is also well documented is the attempt, made by his contempo-
raries Lorentz and FitzGerald, to think about the kinematical phenomena of elec-
tromagnetism in constructive dynamical terms (see, e.g., Janssen 1995). Other
physicists who expressed, along with Einstein himself — as some believe, dis-
senting constructive views of STR are less known in this context. They include
Weyl, Pauli, and Eddington in the 1920s, W.F.G. Swann in the 1930s and the
1940s, and L. Janossy, and J.S. Bell in the 1970s.
In a recent monograph entitled Physical Relativity, Harvey Brown (2005a)
adds himself to this distinguished list of unconventional views on STR, arguing
that the universal constraint on the dynamical laws that govern the nature of non–
gravitational interactions, namely, their Lorentz–covariance, is the true lesson of
STR. My modest goal in this paper and its sequel is to examine two presumably
contentious issues within Brown’s controversial view. The first issue is purely
historical, and concerns Einstein’s attitude towards the constructive approach to
STR. Reading Brown (2005a, pp. 113–114, 2005b) one gets the impression that
Einstein’s ambivalence with respect to his choice in the principle view to STRwar-
rants annexing him to the constructive camp. Here I shall suggest an alternative
interpretation, that also sheds new light on the way Einstein saw the dichotomy
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between principle and constructive theories. The second issue is philosophical
in character and regards the ontological and epistemological commitments be-
hind the constructive approach. It arises from a famous claim, made by J. S. Bell
(1976/1987, p. 77), and repeated by Brown at the outset of his book (2005a, p. 2),
that the constructive approach enforces no commitment to a notion of a preferred
frame, i.e., that one can, in Bell’s words, adapt the Lorentzian pedagogy without
accepting the Lorentzian philosophy. As we shall see, the current state of affairs
in theoretical physics may put some constraints on this neutrality.
In order to achieve these goals I shall take my cue from a rarely cited cor-
respondence between Einstein and the physicist W.F.G. Swann, mentioned only
briefly in Stachel (2002) and in Brown (2005a). In this correspondence Swann
presents Einstein with his constructive approach to STR, wherein rods and clocks
are not introduced as primitive building blocks, or as “independent objects”, but
are taken instead to be material bodies obeying the Lorentz–covariant laws of
the quantum theory of matter. Einstein, in response, argues cryptically that any
such constructive formulation of STR must, like the quantum theory, contain a
fundamental measure of length. My main concern will be to examine how the
postulation of a fundamental measure of length (which, according to Einstein, is
an inevitable consequence of the constructive approach) bears on the two issues I
have set forth to investigate here.
The paper is organized as follows. Section (2) offers an introduction to the
distinction between principle and constructive theories. In section (3) I discuss
the Einstein–Swann correspondence on the constructive approach to STR, and in
sections (4) and (5) I set the record straight with respect to the putative historical
consequences of this correspondence on the constructive programme. Before con-
cluding, in section (6) I mention briefly some aspects that arise in current research
on quantum gravity that bear on the neutrality of the constructive approach to STR
with respect to the question of a preferred frame. These aspects are discussed in
more detail in a sequel to this paper (Hagar 2007).
2 The principle–constructive distinction
2.1 Einstein
In his famous letter to the London Times from November 28, 1919, Einstein men-
tions a distinction between two types of scientific theories, namely “constructive”
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and “principle” theories:1
We can distinguish various kinds of theories in physics. Most of them are
constructive. They attempt to build up a picture of the more complex phe-
nomena out of the materials of the relatively simple formal scheme from
which they start out. Thus the kinetic theory of gases seeks to reduce me-
chanical, thermal and diffusional processes to the movement of molecules,
i.e., to build them up of the hypothesis of molecular motion. When we say
that we have succeeded in understanding a group of natural processes, we
invariably mean that a constructive theory has been found which covers the
processes in question.
Along with this most important class of theories there exists a second which
I will call ‘principle theories’. These employ the analytic, not the synthetic
method,. The elements which form their basis and starting point are not
hypothetically construed but empirically discovered ones, general charac-
teristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to mathematically for-
mulated criteria which the separate processes or the theoretical representa-
tions of them have to satisfy. Thus the science of thermodynamics seeks
by analytical means to deduce necessary conditions which separate events
have to satisfy, from the universally experienced fact that perpetual motion
is impossible.
The advantages of the constructive theory are completeness, adaptability and
clearness. Those of the principle theory are logical perfection and security
of the foundations. The theory of relativity belongs to the latter class. . .
What does this distinction amount to? According to Einstein, in a principle
theory such as thermodynamics (TD) one starts from empirically observed general
properties of phenomena, e.g., the non–existence of perpetual motion machines,
in order to infer general applicable results without making any assumptions on
hypothetical constituents of the system at hand. Another example of a principle
theory in which one employs “the analytic, not the synthetic method” is STR. Its
building blocks — that velocity does not matter and that there is no overtaking
of light by light in empty space — are ‘not hypothetically constructed but em-
pirically discovered’. Statistical mechanics (SM) and its predecessor the kinetic
theory of gases, on the other hand, are constructive theories. They begin, says
Einstein, with certain hypothetical elements and use these as building blocks in an
attempt to construct models of more complex processes. Although ultimate under-
standing requires a constructive theory, admits Einstein in 1919, often progress in
1I quote the second, third, and fourth paragraphs from (Einstein 1919/1982, pp. 227–232).
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theorizing is impeded by premature attempts at developing constructive theories
in the absence of sufficient constraints by means of which to narrow the range of
possible constructions. It is the function of principle theories to provide such con-
straint, and progress is often best achieved by focusing first on the establishment
of such principles.
It is hard to overestimate the importance Einstein’s experts attribute to the
three short paragraphs quoted above. Emphasizing Einstein’s famous appreciation
of the wide applicability of TD, Klein (1967) sees the distinction between princi-
ple and constructive theories as yet another indication of the inspirational power
TD had on Einstein’s thought, especially in conceiving STR. Janssen (2000) be-
lieves that the distinction epitomizes Einstein’s ambivalence towards physics–
theorizing in general. “Einstein resorted to the ‘principle’ type of theory”, says
Janssen, “when he did not have a strong vision of what a satisfactory [constructive
– A.H.] model might look like”. “Since he saw this type of theorizing essentially
as a physics of desperation”, concludes Janssen, “his methodological pronounce-
ments later in life promote the ‘constructive’ approach, which had never gotten
him anywhere, rather than the ‘principle’ approach that had led to all his great
successes”. Howard (2004) sees Einstein’s distinction as his most original contri-
bution to 20th–Century philosophy of science. “While the distinction first made
its way into print in 1919”, says Howard, “there is considerable evidence that it
played an explicit role in Einstein’s thinking much earlier”.2
Howard argues further that in Einstein’s hands the distinction between princi-
ple and constructive theories became a methodological tool of impressive scope
and fertility. This point, while not appreciated as it should be in the philosophy of
science community, is unproblematic. Einstein’s attitude towards to the construc-
tive approach to theoretical physics in general and to STR in particular, on the
contrary, is still under dispute. Indeed, the peculiar ambivalence Einstein demon-
strates in this respect leads Brown (2005ab) to present him as a putative supporter
of the constructive approach to STR.
2Here Howard refers to Einstein’s remark on Boltzmann’s entropy principle, S = k logW ,
which served as the constraint that suggested his own light quanta hypothesis: “Boltzmann’s mag-
nificent idea is of significance for theoretical physics . . . because it provides a heuristic principle
whose range extends beyond the domain of validity of molecular mechanics”. (Einstein 1915, p.
262). See also Einstein’s letters to Ehernfest and Sommerfeld from 1907 and 1908, respectively,
mentioned in (Brown 2005b, p. S85).
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2.2 The constructive approach to STR
Several authors (Bell 1992, Brown 2003) have suggested that the dawn of the
constructive approach to STR can be traced back to a letter, written in 1889 by G.F.
FitzGerald, to the remarkable English auto-deduct, Oliver Heaveside, concerning
a result the latter had just obtained in the field of Maxwellian electrodynamics.
Some months later FitzGerald exploited the idea he had expressed in that letter,
namely, that the distortions suffered by an electric field that surrounds a charged
particle traveling through the ether may be applied to a theory of inter–molecular
forces, to explain the baffling null result of the Michelson–Morley experiment. In
this note appears for the first time a distinct precursor of the FitzGerald–Lorentz
contraction — a cornerstone in the kinematic component of STR.
As Brown (2005a, p. 2) puts it, following Einstein’s brilliant 1905 work on the
electrodynamics of moving bodies, and its geometrization by Minkowski (which
proved to be so important to the development of the general theory of relativity),
“it became standard to view the FitzGerald–Lorentz [contraction – AH] hypothe-
sis as the right idea based on the wrong reasoning”. Brown strongly doubts that
this standard view is correct, and in his monograph, Physical Relativity (Brown
2005a) he joins other physicists who expressed, along with Einstein himself — or
so Brown claims, dissenting constructive views of STR.
Brown’s aim is to advocate what he calls “the big principle” of the constructive
view: that the universal constraint on the dynamical laws that govern the nature of
non–gravitational interactions, namely, their Lorentz–covariance, is the true les-
son of STR. On this view, the explanatory arrow in STR between the structure of
spacetime and the behavior of rods and clocks is reversed: if one could achieve a
dynamical underpinning of this behavior with an ultimate Lorentz–covariant the-
ory of matter, then the “mystery of mysteries” (i.e., how material bodies such
as rods and clocks supposed to know which spacetime they are immersed in and
hence to contract and dilate accordingly)3 will be dispelled, andMinkowski space-
time will regain its appropriate status as a “glorious non–entity” (Brown & Pooley
2004).
3A rod immersed in a Minkowski spacetime is affected when set in motion while a rod im-
mersed in Galilean spacetime is not.
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2.2.1 Bell’s thread
It is worth noting that Brown’s big principle is neither a “no-go” phenomeno-
logical claim nor is it fully constructive,4 hence it will not suffice to pin–point the
difference between the constructive and the principle approaches to STR. This dif-
ference is, on final account, an epistemological one, and as such can be cashed out
in terms of explanatory strategies. Taking our cue from Brown, who emphasizes
that one of his motivations for adapting the constructive approach is the reversal
of the explanatory arrow in STR from geometry to dynamics, it is instructive to
confront the principle and the constructive views in the context of Bell’s thought
experiment that appears in the opening paragraphs of his famous Lorentzian Ped-
agogy paper (Bell 1976, pp. 67–68).5
Bell considers the following situation (see figure 1): three small spaceships,
A, B, and C, drift freely in a region of space remote from other matter, without ro-
tation and without relative motion, with B and C equidistant from A. On reception
of a signal from A the motors of B and C are ignited and they accelerate gently.
Let B and C be identical, and have identical acceleration programmes. Then (as
reckoned by the observer A) they will have at every moment the same velocity
and so remain displaced one from the other by a fixed distance.
Now suppose that one end of a taut thread is attached to the back of B and the
other end to the front of C, assuming that the thread doesn’t affect the motion of
the spaceships. According to STR, the thread must Lorentz–contract with respect
to A because it has relative velocity with respect to A. However, since the space-
ships maintain a constant distance apart with respect to A, the thread (which we
have assumed to be taut from the start) cannot contract; therefore a stress must
form until for high enough velocities the thread finally reaches its elastic limit and
breaks.
A
B
C 6
6
Figure 1
4The best way to view the big principle is as a restrictive structural principle. See Brown
(2005a, p. 147).
5Bell mentions that credit to this thought experiment is due to Dewan and Beran (1959).
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Bell (1976, p. 68) mentions that the knee–jerk reaction of one of his colleagues
as well as the consensus in CERN’s theory division was that the thread will not
break. Further reflection, however, reveals that despite the views that deprive
Lorentz–contraction of any reality STR predicts that (1) the thread will break,
and (2) all the observers in this set–up, namely, A, B, and C, will agree on (1).6
Setting aside the interesting sociological issues that the reactions to this thought
experiment reveal, let us examine the two possible explanations one can give for
facts (1) and (2).
The standard explanation to which the principle view of STR subscribes hinges
the relativity of simultaneity (see, e.g., Dewan 1963, pp. 383–385) since B, for
example, sees C drifting further and further behind (and, conversely, C sees B
drifting further and further ahead) so that the given piece of thread can no longer
span the distance between B and C.7 Put differently, according to the principle
view length–contraction is a result of the observation that the absolute, invari-
ant distance measure in spacetime between two spatiotemporal events is the four
dimensional interval, and that our spatial and temporal measurements of these
events are nothing but covariant projections of this invariant measure on particu-
lar reference frames.8
Howwould the constructive approach explain the phenomenon of the breaking
of the thread? One can look at things from A’s point of view and regard the
spaceships and the thread as material objects, obeying dynamical laws. Once set
in motion relative to A, the material of the spaceships, and of the thread, will
Lorentz–contract: a sufficiently strong thread would pull the spaceships together
and impose FitzGerald contraction on the combined system. But if the spaceships
are too massive to be appreciably accelerated by the fragile thread, the latter has
to break when the velocities become sufficiently great.
The epistemological difference in the explanations adapted by the principle
and constructive views is evident. The first explanation is geometrical, structural,
6Exactly when the thread breaks will depend on its mass, the mass of the spaceships, and their
acceleration plan. See Cornwell (2005).
7One should imagine two clocks that are situated on the two points where the thread is hooked
to B and C. If these clocks are synchronized when B and C are at rest relative to A, then when B
and C start moving with velocity v relative to A in the direction that is depicted in figure 1, the
clock at C will be ahead of the clock in B by lv/C2 where l is the distance between B and C. The
relativity of simultaneity plays a similar role in explaining the “pole in the barn” paradox and the
“twin paradox”.
8Note that in order to further derive the Lorentz metric one must also assume the isotropy of
spacetime, an assumption which is hidden in the synchronization procedure using light signals that
the relativity of simultaneity is based upon. See Brown (2005a, pp. 77–80).
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and non–causal; the second is dynamical and causal. Brown, apparently, believes
that the first is mysterious:
What is required if the so–called spacetime interpretation is to win over
this dynamical approach is that it offers a genuine explanation of universal
Lorentz covariance. This is what is being disputed. Talk of Lorentz co-
variance ‘reflecting the structure of spacetime posited by the theory’ and of
‘tracing the invariance to a common origin’ needs to be fleshed out if we are
to be given a genuine explanation here, something akin to the explanation of
inertia in general relativity. Otherwise we simply have yet another analogue
of Molir´e’s dormative virtue.. . . (Brown 2005a, p. 143)
From our perspective, of course, the direction of the explanation goes the
other way around. It is the Lorentz covariance of the laws that underwrites
the fact that the geometry of spacetime is Minkowskian. (Brown & Pooley
2004, p. 84)
Brown’s complaint, in effect, is that Minkowski spacetime fails to supply a con-
structive (i.e., causal–dynamical) explanation to relativistic effects such as break-
ing of the thread.
Now, this claim is true but it is also vacuously so: after all, the geometrical
structure cited by the principle view is nothing more than a description of the fact
that the physics of non–gravitational interactions is Lorentz–covariant (Brown’s
Big Principle). Furthermore, rarely within this approach does one find the claim
that Minkowski spacetime causes the thread to break.9 Recall that according to
Einstein on this view one is not engaged in postulating some hidden mechanism
behind observed phenomena. Rather, the explanation of the breaking of the thread
in Bell’s thought experiment that this view subscribes to is very similar to the ge-
ometrical explanation that appears, e.g., in (Putnam 1975, pp. 295–296), where, if
one wants to explain why a round peg cannot fit through a square hole, one points
to geometric features of the peg and the board rather than solving the equations
for the motion of all the atoms in the peg and the board.
Brown seems to believe that the constructive view is explanatorily superior to
the principle view, but it is only by restricting explanations to causal–dynamical
explanations that one can justify this claim. Unfortunately, it is not clear that such
a restriction could be justified independently of one’s support in the constructive
9In another place Brown (2005a, p. 24) cites Nerlich (1976, p. 264): “It is because space–time
has a certain shape that worldlines lie as they do”. Maybe Nerlich does intend “because” here to
ascribe causal powers to spacetime. But someone with more caution might simply remain silent
about causation.
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view, and, moreover, it is not clear that, if one restricts oneself to the relevant
level of description, the constructive explanation is really an explanation. One
is reminded of Putnam’s famous dictum: the explanation of an explanation is
not an explanation since even if one could actually write down those solutions to
the equations for the detailed motion of all the atoms in the peg and the board,
such a “micro–explanation” would include a lot of details that are irrelevant to
the question,10 and it would fail to provide any meaningful kind of understanding.
Rather, it is more appropriate to view constructive explanations as consistency
proofs, mere demonstrations that casual–dynamical models are possible for the
phenomenon at hand.11
Be that as it may, instead of delving further into a debate on the alleged supe-
riority of one explanatory view over the other,12 I shall set this matter aside and
turn to examining the two issues I have set forth to investigate in this paper.
3 The Swann–Einstein correspondence
In this section I shall discuss a historical anecdote, mentioned briefly in Brown
(2005a, pp. 119–120), that regards a short correspondence Einstein had in early
1942 with the physicist W.F.G. Swann concerning the constructive approach to
STR. I will use this correspondence to draw some interesting conclusions on
Brown’s project.
3.1 Background
W. F. G. Swann (1884–1962) was born in England, he was educated at Brighton
Technical College, the Royal College of Science, University College, Kings Col-
lege and the City Guilds of London Institute. Swann came to the US in 1913 as
10Obviously, these details should include no geometrical notions — see also section (5.2).
11This view of constructive explanations as consistency proofs was prevalent among 19th Cen-
tury mathematical physicists such as Maxwell and Poincare´, and is even advocated by W.F.G.
Swann (1940, p. 276), another proponent of the constructive approach to whom the following
sections are devoted. Swann, in his inimitable style, compares the relation between constructive
explanations and their respective phenomenological principles to the logical justification that “our
old grandmothers remedies to our aliments as children” receive in terms of the fundamentals of
bacteriology, physiology and chemistry.
12Such a debate threatens to deteriorate since, paraphrasing the debate between Brown & Pooley
(2004) and Balashov & Janssen (2003), one’s man horse is the another’s cart. I attend to this issue
elsewhere (Hagar, in preparation).
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head of the Physical Division of the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism at the
Carnegie Institute in Washington. Later he was Professor of Physics at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota, the University of Chicago and Yale, where he became Director
of the Sloane Laboratory. He was appointed the Director of the Bartol Research
Foundation in 1927.13
Swann advocates his constructive view on STR as early as 1912 in two papers
with lengthy titles he publishes in the Philosophical Magazine (Swann 1912ab).
He returns to this view years later in a series of papers published during the 1930s
and 1940s in Reviews of Modern Physics (and in which he cites no one else but
himself). It is this view which he also repeats in his correspondence with Einstein
in 1942 and in his letter to Eddington that preceded it.
3.1.1 Swann’s constructive approach to STR
Here is Swann in a representative quote from (Swann 1930, pp. 261–263):
If we strip from the theory [STR — AH] all the concepts incidental to its
historical development; the fundamental outstanding dogma which remains
is that the laws of nature — the differential equations — shall remain invari-
ant under the transformation (1)–(4) [the Lorentz transformations — AH].
Once we have written down some proposed laws, the test of this conclusion
is a matter of pen and paper, and not of experiment. . . . It is true that the
principle of the restricted relativity owed its formulation to a belief that the
coordinates associated with the various systems corresponded to the actual
measures; but, once formulated, the working content of the theory, involv-
ing as it does the mathematical invariance of the laws, is independent of this
hypothesis.
13A man of many talents, W.F.G. Swann was an accomplished cellist, founder of the Swarth-
more Symphony Orchestra, a former assistant conductor of the Main Line Orchestra and former
director of the Philadelphia Academy of Music. By the time of his appointment in Bartol, Swann
had already distinguished himself as an excellent teacher, an outstanding researcher, and an emerg-
ing leader of the scientific community. Although Swann is perhaps best known for his experimen-
tal and theoretical efforts in the area of cosmic ray physics, his research interests touched on many
other disciplines such as condensed matter physics, relativity, and charged particle acceleration.
In his capacity as a professor he is perhaps best known as the advisor of E. O. Lawrence who sub-
sequently was awarded the Nobel Prize for developing the cyclotron. Lawrence followed Swann
from Minnesota, to Chicago, and then to Yale where he received his Ph.D. Altogether Swann had
over 250 publications including a popular science book The Architecture of the Universe. In 1967
the International Astronomical Union honored Swann when it gave his name to a crater on the
lunar surface at 52 north latitude and 112 east longitude.
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Up to 1941 Swann’s idea that the fundamental tenet of STR is the Lorentz
covariance of the laws of physics was exemplified solely with electrodynamics.
In 1941 he augmented his view with the claim that “relativity itself would provide
no explanation of the [Lorentz–FitzGerald — AH] contraction were the story not
capable of amplification by additional arguments based fundamentally upon the
existence in nature of some such theory as the quantum theory” (Swann 1941b,
p. 197). In a footnote to this statement Swann mentions that already in his 1912
papers he had made the case for this claim when showing that the mere invari-
ance of the electromagnetic equations, with the electrons regarded as singularities
in them, was insufficient to explain the Lorentz contraction (Swann 1912b, pp.
93–94). A relativistically invariant force equation was necessary in addition to
the invariance of the field equation, but as time progressed it became more and
more evident that “no obvious force equation following the lines of classical elec-
trodynamics could be expected to provide the story of atomic and intermolecular
forces in such a manner as to determine, ultimately, the form and equilibrium of a
material body” (Swann 1941b, p. 197, fn. 4).
Swann’s intuition for the quantum nature of the cohesive forces in matter is
mentioned already in (Swann 1941a), and the motivation for it already appears in
1912, but this intuition is spelled out in full for the first time only in (Swann 1941b,
p. 201), where he discusses the physical changes that a material rod will suffer
when set in motion (I extensively quote Swann here since his correspondence with
Einstein relies heavily on this passage):
When I start the rod in motion, all sorts of acoustical vibrations are set up.
Of course, these will die down in time, but while I might be, perhaps unjus-
tifiably, content if they should die down so as to leave the rod at its original
length as measured in S [when the rod is at rest — AH], I am at loss to know
how the rod decides that it must settle down to a new length determined by
the FitzGerald–Lorentz contraction. . . . It seems that quantum theory, if
relativistically invariant in from, possesses the power to give the necessary
answer. Consider the rod before the motion was imparted to it. What de-
termines its form and stability? According to the quantum theory, these are
determined by its being in a “ground state”. Now the discussion given above
. . . tells us that if the equations are invariant and we have in S, one solution
for, let us say, the ψ function, satisfying the usual conditions of continuity,
etc., then associated with this solution we have an infinite number of other
solutions obtainable from it by a Lorentz transformation, and these are all
possible states in the system S. . . . The ground state for our rod moving in
a velocity v is the state obtainable by a Lorentzian transformation from the
ground state of the rod before the motion was imparted.
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When discussing this passage, Brown (2005a, p. 121), notes that in it Swann
has forcefully demonstrated the power of the constructive approach to STR. First,
the relativity principle is the consequence of the Lorentz covariance of the quan-
tum dynamics, rather than the other way round. Second, the universality of the
behavior of rods and clocks emerges as a consequence of the dynamical argument,
as long as matter of any constitution is assumed in principle to obey quantum the-
ory.14
Detecting an opportunity to propagate his view to a larger readership, Swann
repeats the above words almost verbatim in a letter he sent to Nature on September
23, 1941, which was also the pretext for his correspondence with Einstein on the
subject.
3.1.2 Swann’s letter to Nature
In the second half of 1941 Nature hosted an exchange between the mathemati-
cal physicist J.H. Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington. The former had just re–read
Eddington’s (1939) The Philosophy of Physical Science and was struck by Ed-
dington’s views on the a priori character of the fundamental laws of nature. Jeans
reports that he had read Eddington “with great admiration, but also with grave
doubts as to whether his philosophical position is not wholly unsound” (Jeans
1941, p. 140). The focus of the heated exchange that ensued between the two
distinguished physicists on the pages of Nature (and that attracted the attention
of others, such as Herbert Dingle) was the status of the light postulate of STR
and the null result of the Michelson–Morley experiment. It is here where Swann
enters the stage, and in a letter to Nature, written in September but published only
in December that year (Swann 1941c, p. 692), he spells out his own view on the
role of the null result of the Michelson–Morley experiment in the foundations of
STR.
Swann’s view on this role is rather odd–sounding: he claims that there would
be meaning to STR even if the Lorentz–FitzGerald contraction were not to hold,
and the result of the Michelson–Morley experiment were non–null. What Swann
meant here is that it is a purely mathematical fact that Maxwell’s equations are
Lorentz covariant. This fact, however, does not imply in itself that the transformed
variables appearing in the Lorentz transformations refer to physical quantities ac-
tually measured by an inertial observer moving at the appropriate velocity v rel-
14Several years later in a pedagogical paper published in the American Journal of Physics,
Swann (1960a, pp. 59–61) emphasizes this point when he explicitly constructs an “electron–dial”
clock in his discussion on the twins paradox.
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ative to the original frame. After all, STR, on Swann’s view, while securing the
Lorentz covariance of the equations, does not tell us how rods and clocks behave
in motion.15
Brown (2005a, p. 120) admits that here Swann may have overstated his view.
Indeed, these remarks by Swann are baffling precisely because on his view, the
Lorentz contraction is a result of the Lorentz covariance of the quantum theory of
matter. But if the covariance of all the dynamical laws of nature is what follows
from STR, as Swann claims, then the Lorentz contraction must hold if STR is to
hold any physical meaning.
Replying to Swann, Eddington traces the solution to the Swann’s version of
Brown’s “mystery of mysteries” (i.e., “how a rod decides its extension when it
is given a different motion” (Eddington 1941, p. 692)) to the law of gravitation.
The connection to quantum theory, according to Eddington, is that it supplies us
with a common standard for a measure of length, because “it is only in quantum
theory that a method has been developed of describing material structure by pure
numbers . . . Thus appeal must be made to quantum theory for the definition of the
interval ds, which is the starting-point of relativity theory” (Eddington 1941, p.
693).
3.2 Swann’s letter to Einstein
Swann, it appears, was not impressed with Eddington’s reply, and a month after
his letter to Nature was published, he wrote to Einstein.16 In addition to mention-
ing his Nature letter, Swann enclosed one of his earlier Review of Modern Physics
article on the constructive view to STR from 1941, and asked for Einstein’s opin-
ion on this view:17
I thought you might be interested in the enclosed in view of its relation of
quantum theory to relativity. I gave a digest of it in Nature, December 6, and
there is a comment by Eddington in the same issue. I find it very difficult
15Swann goes on and restates his idea that if a co–moving observer adopts coordinates that
match the moving rod (and clock) associated with a solution to the dynamical equations generated
by the Lorentz symmetry group from the solution of these equation that describes a rod at rest,
then the quantum description of the moving rod (and clock) by the co–moving observer is exactly
the same as the description of the stationary rod by an observer associated with its rest frame.
16Swann’s documented relation with Einstein had started a year earlier, when he tried to get an
academic position for an acquaintance of Einstein, Felix Ehrenhaft.
17As can be seen from the page numbers to which Swann refers in his reaction to Einstein’s
reply (see below), the enclosed Rev .Mod. Phys. paper was Swann’s (1941b).
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to ascertain whether he agrees or disagrees. It seems that he agrees but does
not like to.
As I see it, he wishes to deny the credit of the solution of the paradox to
the quantum theory and give it to something more deep–seated, of which the
quantum theory is an outcome. With this, of course, everyone must agree in
principle, but the situation seems to me a little like one in which someone
should give credit to a person A for a solution of a certain paradox, while
somebody else claimed that it was A’s ancestors to whom the credit should
be given because it was they who were responsible for the existence of A.
Do not feel obligated to reply to this letter unless there is something you
really wish to say about it, as I am only sending you the paper for your
general interest (Swann 1942a).18
Einstein’s response arrived in three weeks, and as we shall see, contained some
very interesting, albeit cryptic, remarks on the constructive view that Swann was
advocating.
3.3 Einstein’s reply
3.3.1 The German Version
Einstein’s response from January 24, 1942 to Swann’s letter and to his Rev. Mod.
Phys. article (and maybe even to Swann’s letter to Nature) was written in German
and reads as follows:
Ich habe erst jetzt die mir freundlich u¨bersandte Arbeit ansehen ko¨nnen.
Mir scehint deren Inhalt war nicht unrichtig, doch in gewissem Sinne ir-
refu¨hrend.
In der speziellen Relativita¨ts–Theorie werden (idealisierte, aber doch im
Prinzip als realisierbar aufgefasste) Massta¨be und Uhren als selbsta¨ndige
physikalische Objekte behandelt, die — als verknu¨pft mit den Koordinaten
der Theorie— in die Aussagen der Theorie mit eingehen. Dabei ist zuna¨chst
u¨ber die strukturellen Naturgesetze nichts weiter ausgesagt, als dass sie mit
Bezug auf so definierte Koordinatensysteme Lorentz–invariant sein sollen.
Es ist zuna¨chst bewusst darauf verzichtet, Massta¨be und Uhren unter Zu-
grundelegung von Struktur–Gesetzen als Lo¨sungen zu behandeln. Dies ist
18All quotes appearing here, including Einstein’s letter, are verbatim, and are reprinted from
the original letters that can be found in Einstein’s archive in the Hebrew University in Jerusalem,
and in the W.F.G. Swann Archive at the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, PA. I thank
Charles Greifenstein from the APS Library for his kind help in accessing the relevant letters.
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darum wohlbegru¨ndet, weil die (prinzipielle) Existenz solcher als Massta¨be
fu¨r Koordinaten dienlicher Objekte vom Standpunkt unserer Erfahrungen
besser begru¨ndet erscheint als irgendwelche besonderen Strukturgesetze, z.B.
die Maxwell’schen Gleichungen.
Fasst man die Sache so auf, so hat der Michelsonversuch sehr wohl mit der
speziellen Relativita¨ts–Theorie zu tun, sobald man das Prinzip von der Kon-
stanz der Lichtgeschwindigkeit oder (daru¨ber hinaus) die Maxwell’schen
Gleichungen hinzunimmt.
Wenn man aber Massta¨be und Uhren nicht als selbsta¨ndige Objekte in die
Theorie einfu¨hren will, so muss man eine strukturelle Theorie haben, in
welcher eine La¨nge fundamental eingeht, die dann zur Existenz von Lo¨sungen
fu¨hrt, in denen jene La¨nge bestimmend eingeht, sodass es nicht mehr eine
kontinuierliche Folge a¨hnlicher Lo¨sungen gibt. Dies ist zwar bei der heuti-
gen Quantentheorie der Fall, hat aber nichts mit deren charakteristichen
Zu¨gen zu tun. Jede Theorie, welche eine universelle La¨nge in ihrem Funda-
ment hat und auf Grund dieses Umstandes qualitativ ausgezeichnete Lo¨sungen
von bestimmter Ausdehnung liefert, wu¨rde inbezug auf die hier ins Auge
gefasste Frage dasselbe leisten. (Einstein 1942)
3.3.2 The English translation
Translated to English, Einstein’s letter reads as follows:19
Only now I have been able to look at the work that you so kindly sent to me.
It seems to me that its content was not incorrect, but still in a certain sense
misleading.
In special theory of relativity measuring rods and clocks (idealized, but in
principle conceived as realizable) are treated as independent physical ob-
jects, which, linked as they are to the coordinates of the theory, will enter
into the propositions of the theory. At first there is nothing stated about the
structural laws of nature other than the fact that they should be Lorentz–
invariant with reference to coordinate systems so defined.
Measuring rods and clocks are consciously not treated as solutions under the
basis of structural laws [this sentence is a little ambiguous in the original].
This is well justified because from the point of view of our experiences,
the (in principle) existence of those objects that can serve as measures for
19I thank Jutta Shickore and Sandy Gliboff (HPSC, IUB) for their help in translating Einstein’s
letter into English.
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coordinates appears better justified than any particular structural laws, e.g.
Maxwell’s equations.
If one looks at the issue this way, the Michelson experiment does indeed
have something to do with special theory of relativity, as soon as one adds the
principle of the constancy of the velocity of light or (furthermore) Maxwell’s
equations.
But if one does NOT [underlined in the original] introduce rods and clocks
as independent objects into the theory, one has to have a structural theory
in which a length is fundamental, which then leads to the existence of solu-
tions in which that length plays a determinant [constitutive] role, so that a
continuous sequence of similar solutions no longer exists. This is the case in
today’s quantum theory but has nothing to do with its characteristic features.
Any theory that has a universal length in its foundation, and because of this
produces qualitatively distinct solutions of a certain extension, would do the
same with regard to the question under examination here.
Before we set forth to decipher this response and to analyze its implications
on some of Brown’s claims, let us end this anecdote with Swann’s reaction to
Einstein’s reply.
3.4 Swann’s reaction
Swann seems to have asked for a translation of Einstein’s letter, and this transla-
tion, which apparently was done by an amateur,20 is enclosed in Swann’s archives.
One can only lament on this infelicity since Einstein’s original German version of
the letter is, to say the least, non–transparent, and as we shall see, an unqualified
translation could easily (and actually did) lead to misunderstanding of Einstein’s
entire point.
Swann’s reaction to Einstein’s letter came a little more than a fortnight later,
and it marks the end of his documented discussions with Einstein’s on the con-
structive approach to STR.21 In his letter Swann (1942b) admits that the point he
was making “did not depend specifically upon all of those features of the quantum
20The translation Swann got looks awkward to a native German speaker, and shows lack of
knowledge of the context and subject matter.
21It appears that Swann maintained contact with Einstein and even visited him in 1950 in Prince-
ton, to discuss a public talk he (Swann) was preparing at the Franklin Institute. No record of this
meeting exists, apart from a letter Swann sent to Einstein after the meeting took place, to which he
attached his planned talk, in order to thank Einstein and to allow him to veto any part of the talk
that regarded Swann’s reconstruction of Einstein’s work on the theories of relativity.
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theory which are of interest in the atomic structure”, and he agrees with Einstein
on the necessity of the constructive theory defining a length. Nevertheless, Swann
claims that there are two additional reasons why one should look at quantum the-
ory.
First, the theory displays a unique ability to supply a (relativistically invariant)
measure of length (here Swann gives Bohr’s hydrogen atom model as an example
where the fundamental length would have been the radius of the first electronic
orbit). Second, the theory allows us, using this measure of length, to determine
what will be the ground state of the rod:
It is this power to fix a length which is a special aspect of the determination
of structural form and that is why, in speaking of the rod, I give the quantum
theory, on page 201 [Swann 1941b — AH], the credit of determining that it
shall be in a ground state [underlined by Swann — AH]. It seems to me that
it is this act of the quantum theory which is significant and which is another
aspect of its power to fix a length. (Swann 1942b)
Swann ends his letter with an apologetic tone:
Please do not feel that it is necessary to reply to this letter. Of course, it is
always a pleasure to hear from you on these matters, but I do not think there
is any very great divergence of view point in this instance.
from which it is clear that Swann had interpreted Einstein’s response as sympa-
thetic to his (constructive) explanation of the Lorentz–FitzGerald contraction with
a Lorentz covariant quantum theory of matter!
4 Reading Einstein
Admittedly, Einstein’s letter to Swann is not one of his famous letters. Nor is
it one of his most transparent. In effect, while mentioned only twice in the vast
literature on the foundations and history of STR, this letter was misunderstood on
both occasions. In this section we shall display these misunderstandings, and then
set the record straight.
4.1 Lost in translation
4.1.1 Stachel’s de-contextualization
In his recent Einstein from ‘B’ to ‘Z’, John Stachel (2002) devotes a chapter to
“Einstein and the Quantum”. Einstein’s letter to Swann appears here for the first
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time in a rather misplaced context. Stachel brings the letter as evidence to the
claim that Einstein (in his attempts to explore the possibility that a field theory
based upon a continuous manifold, the principle of general covariance and par-
tial differential equations, could provide an explanation to quantum phenomena)
sometimes indicated that a fundamental length might be needed to explain the ex-
istence of stable structure in such a field theory. He then (mis)quotes only the last
paragraph of the letter (Stachel 2002, p. 394).
But clearly, by now the reader can appreciate that Einstein’s letter to Swann,
while it may be classified as pertaining to Einstein’s views on the relations be-
tween relativity theories and quantum mechanics, is not in any way meant to indi-
cate what Stachel asserts it does.
While the omission of the letter’s first part (along with its context and attitude
towards the constructive approach) is understandable from an editorial perspec-
tive, it appears to have led Brown to claim that Einstein — while skeptic about the
role quantum theory — nevertheless agreed with Swann that a dynamical expla-
nation of the Lorentz-FitzGerald contraction was wanting.
4.1.2 Brown’s interpretation
Brown (2005a, Ch. 7), devoted as it is to the dissenting, unconventional, voices
on relativity, is a wonderful starting point for any future research on the construc-
tive approach to STR. Brown’s inclusion on the Einstein–Swann correspondence
in this chapter, however, is somewhat misleading. That Einstein expressed mis-
givings about his choice in the principle view is, of course, supported by textual
evidence. I strongly doubt, however, that one can count Einstein’s letter to Swann
as such an evidence (see below), but even if one choosed to do so, there exists an-
other, more interesting problem. Reading Brown one gets the impression that Ein-
stein was attracted to the constructive view to STR in general, but refrained from
embracing Swann’s version of it because of his suspicion of quantum theory.22
Yet the evidence for this narrative is nothing else but the paragraph (mis)quoted
by Stachel:
It is known that Swann corresponded with Einstein on the foundations of
SR; in Stachel (1986) p. 378 [this part appears also in Stachel 2002, p. 394]
– AH], part of a 1942 letter from Einstein to Swann is cited in which he
discusses the possibility of a constructive formulation of the theory wherein
rods and clocks are not introduced as ‘independent objects’. Einstein argues
in this letter that any such theory must, like the quantum theory, contain an
22Brown’s view on this suspicion is documented also in Brown (2005a, pp. 187–190).
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absolute scale of length. It would be interesting to know more about this
correspondence. (Brown 2005a, p. 120, fn. 19)
4.2 A more accurate reconstruction of Einstein’s response
4.2.1 Reading Einstein step by step
Let us look more carefully at Einstein’s response to Swann. The first thing to note
is that from the very beginning, Einstein, in his famous style, is criticizing Swann
without saying so explicitly when he writes in the opening sentence:
. . . It seems to me that the content [of Swann work—AH] was not incorrect
but still in a certain way misleading. [my italics — AH]
I cannot refrain from making an analogy between Einstein’s attitude to Swann’s
work and his reaction to Reichenbach’s Relativity and A Priori Knowledge (1920),
where Einstein, when asked whether he considers true what Reichenbach had as-
serted, mischievously answered “I can only answer with Pilate’s famous question:
‘what is truth?”’ (Schilpp 1949, p. 676).
The second paragraph presents the principle view of STR, in which measuring
rods and clocks are treated as idealized (but in principle realizable) primitives,
i.e., independent, unanalyzed physical objects. On this view nothing is said about
the dynamical laws of nature other than the fact that they should be Lorentz–
invariant with reference to coordinate systems defined by the primitive rods and
clocks. Note that here Einstein restates the epistemological priority, under the
principle view, of the geometrical symmetries of spacetime over the symmetries
of the dynamical laws. To paraphrase Brown again, it is quite clear here which is
the cart and which are the horses.
The next paragraph justifies this principle view: measuring rods and clocks
are “consciously” (i.e., on purpose) not treated as solutions to the dynamical laws
(i.e., solutions to the equations of motion) — as Swann would have it — and this
view is well justified since on the basis of our experience (e.g., the null result of
the Michelson–Morley experiment – see below — or the empirical content of the
relativity principle), the in principle existence of these primitives as measures of
coordinates (i.e., as representing the geometry of spacetime) seems to be better
justified than any given dynamical theory of matter that one may come up with.
This last sentence reminds us of the agnosticism of the principle view with respect
to the actual dynamical model for relativistic phenomena.
However, in Swann’s amateurish translation the first sentence of this paragraph
was translated as saying “We at first consciously desist from treating measures
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and clocks as solutions by taking structural laws as basis”. This was apparently
interpreted to imply that instead of taking rods and clocks as primitives, as the
former paragraph suggests, one should take the dynamical laws as a basis. Clearly
this is not what Einstein meant here, as can be seen from the German version and
from the place of this paragraph in the letter (Einstein turns to the constructive
view only two paragraphs later).
Next comes another blow to Swann’s view: if one looks at the issue this way
(i.e., given the existence of rods and clocks), then the Michelson experiment does
indeed have something to do with special theory of relativity, as soon as one adds
the principle of the constancy of the velocity of light or (furthermore) Maxwell’s
equations.
It is only in the last paragraph where Einstein finally reverts to the constructive
view. Unfortunately, this is the most obscure paragraph in the letter, and any minor
changes in its translation can result in totally different interpretations.
The first sentence of this paragraph is a conditional sentence, with a short
antecedent and a long and winding consequent. The short antecedent is, in para-
phrase, preparing the stage for what, in Einstein’s view, happens when one does
not wish to take measuring rods and clocks as primitives, i.e., when one insists,
contra all what was said before in the letter, to follow the constructive approach
to STR. The long and winding consequent, again in paraphrase, is a logical chain
that follows from the constructive view. First, the dynamical theory that one uti-
lizes in order to construct the kinematical effects (and to explain the geometry of
spacetime) must establish a fundamental measure of length. Second, this (here
“this” is ambiguous — either this fundamental measure of length, or the fact that
the dynamical theory has such a measure length) leads to the existence of solu-
tions (of the dynamical equations) in which length plays a constitutive role. Third,
since this fundamental length appears in the solutions to the equations of motion,
a continuous sequence of similar solutions no longer exists (note that the negation
“no longer exists” can be equally interpreted as quantifying over “continuous”, or
over “similar”, or over both).
The second sentence of the last paragraph is straightforward and says that the
introduction of a fundamental measure of length is indeed the case with today’s
quantum theory but has nothing to do with its characteristic features. The final
sentence then says that any theory which has a universal length in its foundations
and because of this circumstance yields qualitatively distinguished or distinct so-
lutions of a certain extent would do the same with respect to the question under
examination here.
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4.2.2 Taking stock
We can divide Einstein’s response to Swann into four distinct parts. The first is the
opening sentence that sets the tone: Swann’s view on the role of the Michelson–
Morley experiment, and on the role quantum theory plays in dynamically explain-
ing the Lorentz–FitzGerald contraction is, according to Einstein, misleading. The
second is the description of the standard, principle, view of STR, where rods and
clocks are taken as primitives, and the explanation of the Lorentz–contraction is a
geometrical one. The third is the admission that one can reject the principle view
and adapt the constructive view instead, and the warning that such a move entails
several non–trivial consequences, at least one of them being discontinuity. The
final part is the observation that any attempt to dynamically explain spacetime
geometry (irrespective of quantum theory) will have the same consequences.
The first conclusion from this reconstruction is that, contrary to what Swann
wanted to believe, in his letter Einstein was expressing little sympathy to Swann’s
view. This may be a warning sign against the broader claim Brown is making
throughout his project regarding Einstein’s views on the principle–constructive
distinction. I shall examine this claim in detail in the following section (5). The
second conclusion is more philosophical. His letter to Swann gives us a rare
opportunity to discuss what Einstein saw as an inevitable result of the constructive
approach to STR. Deferring the analysis of these issues to the sequel article, I
breifly comment on them in section (6).
5 Einstein and the constructive approach to STR
5.1 The physics of despair
A recurrent theme in Brown’s project is the claim that Einstein expressed, through-
out the years from 1907 and at least until 1949, a certain “unease” with respect to
his choice in the principle view of STR:23
When Einstein formulated his 1905 treatment of relativistic kinematics, the
23Einstein’s misgivings are voiced in Einstein’s (1907) letter to Ehrenfest, Einstein’s (1908) let-
ter to Sommerfeld, Einstein’s (1919) letter to the London Times, Einstein’s (1921) famous paper
on Geometry and Experience, and several quotes from Einstein’s reflections in his Autobiograph-
ical Notes (Schilpp 1949). In some of these quotes Einstein mentions that the example he had in
his mind when retreating to the principle view of STR was TD, where, although no assumptions
on the constitution of matter are made, few phenomenological and restrictive principles suffice to
predict the behavior of bulk matter.
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template in his mind was thermodynamics. This was because a more de-
sirable ‘constructive’ account of the behaviour of moving rods and clocks,
based on the detailed physics governing their microscopic constitution, was
unavailable. The price to be paid was appreciated by Einstein and a handful
of others since 1905. (Brown 2005b, p. S85)
Einstein’s choice in the principle view, says Brown (2005b, p. S87–S89), was
a choice of despair. Since several months before the publication of “The elec-
trodynamics of moving bodies” Einstein has written another revolutionary paper
claiming that electromagnetic radiation has a granular structure, the assumption,
prevalent among his contemporaries, that Maxwellian electrodynamics is strictly
true, had lost his trust. If Maxwell’s equations were thought by Einstein as in-
compatible with the existence of the photon, then there was no sense in trying to
write down a constructive, dynamical, theory for relativistic kinematical effects
on the basis of classical electrodynamics as the latter could not be regarded as
the complete theory of the constitution of matter. Einstein would have preferred
a constructive account of the relativistic effects of length contraction and time
dilation, but in 1905 the elements of such an account were unavailable.
Now let us ignore Einstein’s documented ambivalence with respect to the con-
structive approach, and suppose for the sake of the argument that the question
regarding Einstein’s opinion is not only historically important but also unequiv-
ocally decidable. Let us even grant Brown’s narrative above. Yet a puzzle still
remains. Indeed, if, as Brown argues, Einstein was so in favor of the constructive
approach to STR and saw the principle view of 1905 as a choice of despair, then
why, years later in his letter to Swann, after a relativistic quantum theory of matter
has become available, he was still reluctant to acknowledge its implications on his
choice?
Brown (2005a, p. 114) side–steps this embarrassing question by suggesting
that Einstein’s “long–standing distrust” and hostility towards quantum theory pre-
vented him from recognizing the progress in the theory and its implication on the
formulation of STR. However, as we can see from the last paragraph of his letter
to Swann and from other writings I shall quote below, Einstein was troubled not
with quantum theory per se, but with what he regarded as a general feature of the
constructive approach to STR, namely, the fact that any such attempt to dynam-
ically explain the geometrical structure of spacetime would entail the departure
from the physics of the continuum.
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5.2 Discontinuity
There is no doubt that the principle–constructive dichotomy was a major theme in
Einstein’s view on STR, and Brown (2005a) is an excellent example of the fruit-
fulness of the attempts to reconstruct this view within its framework. But there
exists a parallel, even more important, dichotomy with which one can describe
Einstein’s lifework, namely, continuum– or noncontinuum– based physics.
As Holton (1972) and Stachel (1993) note, at first glance most of Einstein’s
work pertains to the physics of the continuum in both its physical and its philo-
sophical aspects: his conclusion, based on STR, that direct–interaction theories
are no longer tenable once one recognizes the existence of a maximum signal ve-
locity (Schilpp 1949, p. 61), his forty years long search for a unified field theory
of gravitation and electromagnetism, and the field theoretic account of gravitation
given in the general theory of relativity (GTR). On the other hand, discontinuity
and discreteness also played an important role in Einstein’s work — e.g., classical
atomism as embodied in his work on Brownian motion, his light–quanta hypoth-
esis, and his contribution to the Bose–Einstein statistics.
Stachel (1993, p. 276) remarks that the spacetime arena unifies the continuum
and the discrete since both (continuous) fields and (discontinuous) atoms find their
home in the spacetime continuum. This leads him to discuss what Einstein saw
as the alternative to continuum–based physics which does not take spacetime as a
primitive. Einstein refereed to such physics as “purely algebraic”:
. . . [O]ne does not have the right today to maintain that the foundation [of
theoretical physics – AH] must consist in a field theory [emphasis in the
original] in the sense of Maxwell. The other possibility, however, leads in
my opinion to a renunciation of the spacetime continuum and to a purely
algebraic physics. . . . For the present, however, instinct rebels against such
a theory. (Einstein to Paul Langevin, October 1935, in Stachel 1993, p. 285)
To be sure, it has been pointed out that the introduction of a space-time con-
tinuum may be considered as contrary to nature in view of the molecular
structure of everything which happens on a small scale. It is maintained
that perhaps the success of the Heisenberg method points to a purely alge-
braical method of description of nature, that is to the elimination of con-
tinuous functions from physics. Then, however, we must also give up, by
principle, the space-time continuum. It is not unimaginable that human in-
genuity will some day find methods which will make it possible to proceed
along such a path. At the present time, however, such a program looks like
an attempt to breathe in empty space. (Einstein 1954/1982. p. 319)
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The alternative continuum–discontinuum seems to me to be a real alterna-
tive; i.e., there is no compromise. By discontinuum theory I understand
one in which there are no differential quotients. In such a theory space and
time cannot occur, but only numbers and number–fields and rules for the
formation of such on the basis of algebraic rules with exclusion of limiting
processes. Which way will prove itself, only success can teach us. (Einstein
to H.S. Joachim, August 1954, in Stachel 1993, p. 287)
In his essay Stachel exposes Einstein’s ambivalence towards the physics of the
discontinuum, and it is against this background that I suggest to read Einstein’s
letter to Swann. As we have seen, the difference between the principle and the
constructive views is mainly epistemological: while the former foster structural
explanations (and in the case of STR, geometrical ones) of the sort “what is the
structure of the world like if certain principles are to hold in it?”, the latter promote
causal–dynamical explanations. However, if one adapts the constructive approach
to STR, aiming to dynamically explain spacetime geometry itself, one cannot
assume any geometry in one’s explanans. For this reason, I believe, Einstein
argues in his letter to Swann that his constructive approach to STR must introduce
a fundamental measure of length. Furthermore, taking into account Einstein’s
views on the continuum–discontinuum distinction, one can also understand why,
according to Einstein, a departure from continuum–based physics is the mark of
any such constructive theory.24
Note that on this view Einstein’s reaction to Swann’s letter is definitely not
meant to express hostility to quantum theory per se on the basis of his “long–
standing distrust”, nor should it be interpreted as expounding the (false) claim that
quantum theory is inconsistent with the continuum.25 Rather, I believe that here
Einstein is expressing his worries about the consequences of the attempt to con-
struct spacetime structure from a more fundamental theory. For noncontinuum–
based physics would be the kind of physics Swann would end up with if he refused
to take spacetime structure as fundamental and exchanged the explanans for the
expalanandum, no matter what dynamical theory he would use.
I realize, of course, that the temptation to use Einstein’s hostility to quantum
24Exactly when did Einstein start to consider the problem of formulating statements about the
discontinuum without calling into aid the continuum spacetime is still unclear. Stachel (1993)
cites Einstein’s letter to Walter Da¨llenbach from November 1916 as the first direct evidence, but
suggests (p. 281) that Einstein may have started to think upon this question well before his work
on general relativity.
25If one assumes that quantum dynamics is enacted on a background spacetime continuum, then
of course it is consistent with the continuum.
26
theory as a “catch–all” narrative is strong: it is well known that Einstein was ac-
cused of “rigid adherence to classical theory”, and similarly to Brown, most com-
mentators interpret this rigidity as manifest in Einstein’s view of quantum theory
as incomplete (Bohr in Schillp 1949, p. 235), or in his reluctance to abandon the
notion of separability (Howard 1985), or even in his prejudice for causality (Fine
1986, pp. 100–103). But the correct interpretation of this rigidity was given by
Einstein himself:26
The opinion that continuous fields are to be viewed as the only acceptable
basic concepts, which must also [be assumed to] underlie the theory of ma-
terial particles, soon won out. Now this conception became, so to speak,
“classical;”, but a proper, and in principle complete, theory has not grown
out of it. . . . Consequently there is, strictly speaking, today no such thing
as a classical field–theory; one can, therefore, also not rigidly adhere to it.
Nevertheless, field theory does exist as a program: “Continuous functions in
the four–dimensional [continuum] as basic concepts of the theory.” Rigid ad-
herence to this program can be rightfully be asserted of me. (Schilpp 1949,
p. 675)
6 Length matters
Setting these historical issues aside, I would like to end with matters more philo-
sophical. The amazing fact is that Einstein had an intuition about problems yet to
come almost 50 years in advance, and his idea of a “purely algebraic physics” has
turned out to be almost prophetic, as is sometimes acknowledged in the quantum
gravity literature:
To my great surprise, I recently learned from an essay by John Stachel [here
the author cites Stachel (1993) – AH], that the ideas explored here are very
similar to the ones that Einstein was exploring near the end of his career.
Apparently, these ideas remained obscure because Einstein did not have the
mathematical tools to carry them to fruition, and discussed them only orally
or in letters. . . . I was able to resist the urge to retitle this paper ”On some
26In this passage Einstein directly responds to the “friendly accusation” made by Pauli:
The theoretical determination of the fine structure constant is certainly the most
important of the unsolved problems of modern physics. We believe that any regres-
sion to the ideas of classical physics (as, for instance, to the use of the classical field
concept) cannot bring us nearer to this goal. (Pauli in Schilpp 1949, p. 158)
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ideas of Professor Einstein,” but given the unconventional nature of my pro-
posal, I am happy for the moral support. Einstein, after all, was often ahead
of his time. (Crane 1995)
Even more surprising is the fact that Einstein’s insight about minimal length
has also turned out to be correct.
6.1 Minimal length in quantum gravity
One can identify two possible conditionals in the last paragraph of Einstein’s let-
ter to Swann. The first says that any constructive approach to STR must depart
from the continuum and employ a notion of a fundamental length (call this con-
ditional LENGTH). The second says that any theory that employs such a funda-
mental length must break the continuous Lorentz symmetry (call this conditional
BREAK). In section (5) I have suggested that Einstein believed that LENGTH
holds. Whether Einstein thought BREAK is true is an open historical question.
But the interesting philosophical (and mathematical) question is whether
LENGTH and BREAK are true. This question is of crucial importance, espe-
cially in the context of the attempts to unify quantum theory and GTR. Indeed,
as Brown himself admits (Brown 2005a, p. 151, p. 171, pp. 176–177), there ex-
ists a tension between the dynamical approach to STR and the structure of GTR.
Recall that the local validity of STR is derived from what Brown calls (2005a,
pp. 169–172) the Strong Equivalence Principle (SEP). This tension between the
dynamical approach and GTR is manifest in two of the following three possibil-
ities: (i) SEP is fundamentally true; (ii) SEP is only phenomenology true (i.e.,
in a certain limit) but its violations are undetectable; and (iii) SEP is not only
fundamentally false but also phenomenologically false, and its violations may be
detected in certain scenarios. Clearly, that LENGTH may be true is inconsequen-
tial here, but if BREAK were true, then option (i) would be false, and Brown’s
big principle would cease to be fundamental. Note also that Brown’s detachment
from the epistemological interpretation of STR constrains him to deny (ii).27
While I admit I couldn’t find any a priori argument for the truth of LENGTH
or BREAK, the remarkable (contingent?) fact is that the current theoretical land-
scape in quantum gravity has vindicated Einstein’s belief in LENGTH: a large
27Notably, Bell, at least at some points along his career (e.g., Bell 1986, 48–50), supported
Bohmian mechanics — a theory that violates STR but also incorporates a dynamical mechanism
that prevents us from detecting this violation, and thus employs exactly the type of Lorentzian
philosophy from which Brown is detaching himself.
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number of convincing semiclassical considerations indicate that in a quantum the-
ory of gravity the Planck length Lp ≡
√
~G/c3 ∼ 1.6·10−35m should play the
role of minimal observable length (Garay 1995). This is indeed the case in most,
if not all, tentative quantum theories of gravity, e.g., string theory (Smolin 2001,
pp. 179–193), canonical quantum gravity (Butterfield and Isham 2001) and loop
quantum gravity (Rovelli 2004, pp. 249–259).
Whether or not the current state of affairs in theoretical and experimental high
energy physics vindicates BREAK, however, is still an open question — perhaps
the most fascinating and crucial question in the quantum gravity research pro-
gram.28 How high are the stakes here, it seems, was already clear to Einstein:
I consider it entirely possible that physics cannot be based upon the field
concept, that is, on continuous structures. Then nothing will remain of my
whole castle in the air including the theory of gravitation, but also nothing of
the rest of contempoary physics. (Einstein to Besso, August 1954, translated
in Stachel 1993, p. 286)
7 Concluding remarks
Defending them with textual evidence, in this paper I have made the following
historical observations:
• Einstein’s letter to Swann can be interpreted as a warning against the con-
sequences of pursuing a constructive approach to spacetime theories such
as STR. This approach, says Einstein, leads to (1) an introduction of a fun-
damental length scale, (2) an algebraic view of nature, and (3) a departure
from continuum–based physics.
• Einstein’s 1905 choice in the principle view of STR may have signified a
choice of despair, but his reluctance to embrace the constructive approach in
his later years can be interpreted as a “rigid adherence” to continuum–based
physics.
These observations lead me to conjecture that notwithstanding his apprecia-
tion of the constructive approach to theoretical physics in general, in the context
of STR Einstein would have still preferred the geometrical explanation of the rel-
ativistic kinematical effects as fostered by Minkowski’s spacetime structure over
28For a detailed examination of this question and its consequence on Brown’s approach the
reader is referred to a sequel to this paper (Hagar 2007).
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the dynamical explanation that Brown advocates. I fully realize, however, that
Einstein’s view on this matter, if at all important today, is open to different in-
terpretations due to his documented ambivalence regarding the two dichotomies
discussed here.
Additional support to these observations can be found in Einstein’s views on
the separability principle. It is well known that Einstein regarded this principle as
constitutive to any physical theory since it provides a clear cut criterion for indi-
viduation: one can draw the lines between the parts of the universe anywhere one
wants — “there are “joints” everywhere” (Einstein 1948, cited in Howard 1993, p.
239). Field theory does this in the most extreme possible fashion, adds Howard,
by regarding every infinitesimal region of spacetime as a separate system char-
acterized by its own, separate state. Howard then notes that loss of separability,
brought by quantum mechanics, also signified the departure from the spatiotem-
poral description of nature. The analysis presented here allows one to include
Einstein’s reluctance to abandon the continuum within the same realistic research
program which Howard (1993) describes — a research program that prevented
him from fully supporting to the constructive approach to STR.
It is a remarkable fact that although there is no a priori argument for it, Ein-
stein’s belief that the attempt to explain geometry with dynamics will lead to
breakdown of continuity, is vindicated by the current state of affairs in quantum
gravity. Whether the constructive approach will lead to breakdown of Lorentz
symmetry is still an open question. Naturally, the competing theories of quan-
tum gravity have yet to supply us with definite predictions that can elevate the
research in this domain from pure mathematics to actual science (for a progress
in this directions see Amelino Camelia (2002)). But even under this proviso, and
thanks to Einstein who had prophetically opened up these questions in his letter to
Swann, the analysis presented here puts interesting constraints on the advocates of
the constructive approach to STR: in their theoretical choices within the domain
of quantum gravity they would have to take into account that length matters.29
29Thanks to Harvey Brown for several discussions throughout the years and for interesting com-
ments on this paper, Giovanni Amelino Camelia for email correspondence, Itamar Pitowsky for
insightful suggestions, Bill Demolpoulos for constructive skepticism, and Meir Hemmo for par-
ticularly stimulating brainstorming sessions on the constructive approach to STR and for helpful
comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to Sandy Gliboff and Jutta Shickore for their kind
help in translating Einstein’s letter and in matters historiosophical, and to an anonymous referee
who insisted that the length of this paper matters . . .
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